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acknowledged.1.  Introduction
As a stylized fact, there is great uncertainty about incomes and health in underdeveloped
rural economies, and the instruments to insure against those risks are weak or absent. At the same
time, there is pervasive poverty. Are these features of poor rural economies causally connected?
In particular, does risk promote forms of rational behavior which help perpetuate poverty?
One way that risk might create poverty is by inducing poor credit-constrained households
to hold high levels of relatively unproductive liquid wealth. 2 If borrowing is not an option when
there is a sudden drop in income, then liquid wealth will be needed to protect consumption.
Famously, Keynes (1973, p.170) identified a "precautionary motive" as "..the desire for security
as to the future cash equivalent of a certain proportion of total resources".  Less famously, he also
believed that India was "..a country impoverished by a preference for liquidity" which stifled the
"growth of real wealth" (Keynes, 1973, p.337). 3
IThe  idea that (rational) portfolio behavior in the presence of uninsured risk can help
perpetuate poverty appears to be longstanding. It can be found in relatively early writings on
2  Strictly,  borrowing  constraints  are not necessary  for precautionary  saving.  If the marginal
utility  of current  consumption  is a convex  function  of consumption  then (by Jensen's inequality)  a mean-
preserving  increase  in uncertainty  about  future incomes  will increase  the marginal  utility of future
consumption;  current savings will rise to preserve  intertemporal  equilibrium  even  without borrowing
constraints  (see, for example,  Gersovitz,  1988).  Such a model.does  not, however,  explain an effect on the
composition  of wealth holdings;  higher  risk will encourage  higher  saving,  but it can be in any form. Nor
is precautionary  saving  the only way in which risk can create poverty.  Another  is via effects on
production  decisions;  for example,  outmoded  agricultural  technologies  may persist because  they are less
risky (see, for example,  Morduch,  1995).
3  It is not at all clear from Keynes  (1973) what his own  views on the causes of poverty in India
were based on. In his biography  of Keynes,  Skidelsky (1983,  p. 176)  writes  that, "although he was to
write and advise  extensively  on Indian  affairs,  the furthest  east he ever  got was Egypt; the only Indians  he
ever met were at Cambridge  or London;  the only books he ever  read on India  were specialized  tomes on
finance".
2finance and development  (such as Patrick,  1966) as well as recent  discussions  (World  Bank,
1998),  and emerges in more formal  terms in the Bencivenga  and Smith  (1991)  model of
endogenous  growth with multiple  assets.  The idea has also been  seen to strengthen  the case for
public  efforts  to promote better institutions  for financial  intermediation  in poor rural economies.
The plausibility  of the claim  that precautionary  portfolio  behavior  can cause  poverty is
not self-evident,  however. One  can readily  agree that there are benefits  to poor people from self-
insurance;  they are likely to be more  credit  constrained,  ancl  (possibly)  more averse to risk and
more exposed  to it. But there are costs  too, and arguably  the poor will not be able to afford to
hold a large share  of their wealth  in unproductive  forms.  Poverty  is surely  a strong inducement  to
assuring  that one's own resources  are not idle. Adequate  insurance  may still  be possible by
holding  only moderately  liquid but still  relatively  productive  forms of wealth.
This paper aims to contribute  to knowledge  about behavioral  responses  to risk in poor
rural economies  and the role this might play in perpetuating  poverty.  Formal  economic  models  of
saving  behavior  have only recently  begun  to systematically  incorporate  uncertainty. 4 A new
body of microeconometric  work using data from underdeveloped  agrarian  economies  has looked
for effects  of rainfall  variability  and other  income risks on tlle flow of consumption  or savings
(including  asset transactions),  or on growth  rates of consumption. 5 However,  as Keynes argued,
4  Contributions  include  Zeldes  (1989),  Caballero  (1990),  Kimball  (1990),  Carroll  (1992,  1997)
and  Deaton  (1991,  1992).
5  For  surveys  of past  research  on risk  and  savings  in developing  countries  see  Gersovitz  (1988),
Alderman  and  Paxson  (1992)  and  Besley  (1995).  Empirical  studies  of the  effect  of income  risk  or
variability  on savings  behavior  (including  asset  transactions)  in poor  rural  economies  include  Paxson
(1992),  Rosenzweig  and  Binswanger  (1993),  Rosenzweig  and Wolpin  (1993),  Alderman  (1996),  Dercon
(1998)  and  Fafchamps,  Udry  and  Czukas  (1998).  Carroll  and Sarnawick  (1997)  review  recent  research  on
3and has since been formalized  in theories  of demand  for money  balances  when the.future  interest
rate is uncertain  (following  Tobin, 1958),  it is the stock  of their liquid wealth which  protects
people  from risk, not the flow into wealth  as such. So instead  of looking  for effects  of risk on the
flows of savings or consumption,  this paper tests directly  for portfolio  effects of risk. In
particular,  we test whether  those  households  facing  higher idiosyncratic  risk to their incomes
tend to hold a higher share  of their wealth in unproductive  liquid form than one would  expect
given  1heir  permanent  income and other characteristics.  We also  test for other potentially  costly
responses  to risk.
The setting for our empirical  work is rural areas of southwest  and southern  China. 6 Our
data cover a period (1985-90)  after  reforms  began which entailed  abandoning  the old commune
system of agricultural  production  in favor of allowing  individual  farmers  the freedom  to make
their own production  choices. Previous  research found considerable  vulnerability  to
idiosyncratic  risk in this setting  (Jalan  and Ravallion,  1998a). So an aggregate  (village-  or area-
wide) measure  of risk, such as rainfall,  is unlikely  to provide  a good estimate of individual
incom,e  risk. Here we use instead  the household-specific  income  process over time to identify
income  risk, following  Carroll  and Samwick  (1997).  We extend  this method  by controlling  for
any persistence  in the errors of the income process.
We find that the share  of wealth  held in liquid form has a severely  skewed and kurtotic
distribution,  and that this non-normality  persists  after controlling  for a broad set of household
precautionary  saving  in developed  countries.
6  For  a comprehensive  overview  of what  is currently  known  about  household  savings  behavior  in
China  see  Kraay  (1997).
4characteristics.  With such heavy tails in the distribution, standard estimation methods found in
the literature will not be robust.  To assure that our analysis of responses to risk is robust to the
non-normality, we apply recent advances in quantile regression methods.
We also allow for two other sources of risk that we expect to be important in this setting,
namely the variability of foodgrain yields on the household's own farm, and a measure of
medical risk. Transport and transaction costs in this setting could mean that risks to own-farm
food output matter independently of their implications for overall income risk. Health risk could
well entail large increases in medical spending which would influence savings.  There has been
work on the effects of such health risks on precautionary saving for developed countries, though
no behavioral responses have been identified. 7
There is a further issue of how "liquid wealth" should be defined in a poor rural
economy. One might focus solely on money balances (cash in hand). However, a foodgrain stock
can also be a good hedge, as has been recognized in the literature. 8 So we define liquid wealth as
grain stock plus cash in hand. In defining total wealth we exclude land, which is mainly allocated
administratively in rural China; since the market is very thin, valuation is impossible. Non-liquid
wealth includes bank deposits, farm capital, livestock, housiing and consumer durables.
Besides holding liquid wealth, we examine two other ways in which households might
protect themselves from risk in this setting, namely by not sending their children to school and
7  We refer to the work  of Hubbard,  Skinner and Zeldes  (1994), who find no effect of health risk
on savings  using U.S. data.
s See, for example,  Patrick  (1966).  There is recent supportive  evidence  on the precautionary  role
of foodgrain  stocks from Park's (1995)  surveys in poor areas of northwest  China.
5by temporary out migration of family labor (which,though restricted in the past, is becoming
more common in China).  One could make theoretical arguments either way about how risk
affects these variables. Consider labor export. Greater income uncertainty might encourage out
migration as a risk diversification strategy (as argued in, for example, Rosenzweig, 1988).
Alternatively, when rural labor markets are thin, risk can discourage migration, due to concerns
about possible labor shortage on the farm. This is plausible in rural China, given that farm labor
markets are also thin or non-existent.  A labor surplus on average is not then sufficient for out
migration - the family will also take account of the variability in demand for family labor.
Consider schooling instead. It has been argued that income risk discourages investment in human
capital., though there is little evidence.9 Again the effect could go either way. On the one hand,
keepinig kids in school may expose the family to higher risk of family labor shortage, but (on the
other hand) better educated children could be expected to directly reduce future income risk.
The next section outlines our test for risk effects on liquid wealth holding.  Section 3
describes our data, while section 4 presents our results. Conclusions are in section 5.
2.  Modeling  behavioral responses to risk
It will help motivate our empirical analysis to begin by considering a simple theoretical
model of a farm-household's choice between holding liquid wealth and investing in a risky
production activity.
9 The only study  we know of is Jacoby and Skoufias  (1997), who find seasonal  effects  on
schooling  of income  risk in semi-arid  areas of India.
62.1  A model ofprecautionary  wealth
Consider  a household  facing  a two-period  decision  on how to allocate  its initial wealth W
between current  consumption,  investing  an amount  K in a risky production  activity,  and holding
an amount Mof an unproductive  but secure liquid  asset. Utillity  at any date is a strictly
increasing  and concave  function  of consumption  at that date, and goes to minus infinity  as
consumption  goes to zero.  Utility in the first period is U(W-K-M).  Output in the second  period is
F(K,  ,)  where  F is increasing  and non-convex  in K but also (lepends  on the realization  of a
random variable  t.  The value of F(K, 4) exceeds  K for at least some  values of  . F(K, 4) is also
assumed  to fall to zero  (a total crop failure,  for example)  for some  values of 4 irrespective  of the
value of K. These conditions  assure that there will be positive investment  in the risky activity,
but that at least some  liquid wealth  will also be held  as insuramce  (for otherwise  there is a
positive probability  of zero consumption,  which  gives  infinite  disutility).  The choice  of K and M
maximizes  expected  utility:
U(W -K  -Mf) +E  EU[F(K,  4) -,fl  l
Since our assumptions  imply interior solutions  for K and M thiese  must satisfy:
U'(W -K -M)  =E, ,U'[  F(K,+) tM]
(2)
E  EqU'[F(K,4)  MIF  K(K,  4)
The choice of M and K will depend  on W  and the properties  of the distribution  of 4. On
differentiating  (2) with respect to W  and exploiting  the second-order  conditions  it is readily
7verified  that M will be a strictly increasing  function  of W if and only if:
E  U'(F +M)FKK  + U"(F+M)(FK-  I)F  K]  <  0  (3)
A sufficient  condition  is that FK>  1 for all  ,.  This must hold for some  R since  F(K)>K,  but it may
not hold at all values.  Nonetheless,  the inequality  in (3) is not a strong  assumption,  and it implies
that it will be the poorest (in terms of W) who  hold the lowest amount  of liquid wealth at any
given level  of risk. So this model  must make one immediately  skeptical  of any claim that
precautionary  liquidity  preference  is largely  confined  to the poor.
To give  a tractable example  with an explicit solution  for this model,  suppose  that there
are two possible  outcomes  in the second  period:  either the investment  fails  to produce anything
or it succeeds,  with a rate of return r>O.  Suppose  also that individuals  hold logarithmic  utility
functions.  Then M and K maximize  In(W-K-M)+p.  lnM+(l-p).ln[(l+r)K+M  where  p is the
(positive)  probability  of failure.  It is readily  verified  that the solution  for M is  p(l +  1  /r)  W/2 which
is strictly  increasing  in both Wand  p, and decreasing  in r. Notice  that not only do the poorest (in
terms of W)  hold the lowest amount  of liquid wealth at any given level of risk and rate of return,
but their demand  for this formn  of wealth  is least responsive  to risk (since  aM/ap  is increasing  in
W). Total  wealth carried  over is WJ2  and  the share  of it held in liquid  form (MI(M+K))  is
p(l+llr)l4.  For example,  with a 25% rate  of return and a 20% chance  of failure,  one quarter of
wealth will be held in liquid form.
This model  could be extended  in any number  of ways. For example,  one could easily
introduce  transaction  costs which  are decreasing  in M, implying  both a "transactions  motive" and
8"precautionary  motive" for liquidity.  Heterogeneity  can be readily introduced  by allowing  for a
vector  of household  characteristics  that influence  either the utility function  or the production
function. At high levels of initial wealth  one might also conjecture  that the above model will
become  less  relevant, since more  efficient  means of insurance  will probably  become  available.
To sketch  an extended  version of the above  model  which incorporates  an alternative  insurance
instrument,  let us assume that crop insurance  is offered  to any farmer  who is willing  to pay some
positive minimum  premium in the first period,  sufficient  to cover a fixed administrative  cost and
the insurer's expected  payout  in the second  period. Beyond some  critical  initial wealth
(sufficient  to afford  the crop insurance),  this option will start  to be the preferred  method of
insurance  because  its payouts are state contingent. Thus one can expect  that demand for liquid
wealth  as insurance  will initially  rise with wealth,  but then fall after some  point.
2.2  Method  of testingfor precautionary  responses to risk
To implement  an empirical  test for precautionary  behavior  we must find a measure of the
income risk facing  the household. Here we follow  Carroll amd  Samwick  (1997)  in basing that
measure  on the estimated  innovation  errors  from an income process  of the following  form:
InYi, = a+X  +eI,(4)
where Y. is the income of household  i in time t, and Xi  is a vector  of exogenous  variables. The
error structure  is assumed  to be:
li + Vit  (5)
9where 11,  is a random individual  component  with mean zero  and variance a
In the standard error component  model, the errors are  only correlated  over time through
the individc,  A  specific  effect Ti. The v. 's are assumed  to be i.i.d. random  variables. However,
for a variable like income it is quite  possible  that an unobserved  shock in the current period  will
affect  t]he  behavioral  relationship  in at least the next period  if not more. The persistence  in the
errors of the income process  over time implies that simply  using the variance of the estimated
v,'s as the income uncertainty  measure  will understate  the total income  risk. In order  to estimate
precautionary  savings, we need  the variance  of an i.i.d process.
We assume that the random  variable  v., is an AR(1)  process:
,it  P  Vit,-I  it  (6)
where  p  (with I  p  I <  1 ) is the serial  correlation  coefficient  and (of,  is a random i.i.d. error with
mean zero and variance  . Ignoring  the serial correlation  will still give consistent  estimates  of
the regression  coefficients,  but the standard  errors will be biased which  will bias our estimate  for
income  uncertainty. The explanatory  variables  are assumed  to be orthogonal  to il, and xi,, i.e.,
E(Xi,'  l)  = E(Xi, I,)d  = E(1 'co),)  =  0  (7)
We first test for p =  0 using the Bhargava,  Franzini  and  Narendranathan  (1982)  generalized
Durbin-Watson  statistic  (d  p)."' Provided  we reject the null that p =  0, we transform  the usual
10 The test statistic  is:
N  T  N  r
dp=  S  E  (u  -u  2/  E 
f=1 t=2  1t=1
10AR(l)  model into a serially uncorrelated regression with independent observations using the
Prais-Winsten transformation.  Thus the transformed regression disturbances are:
£  (I,  C) 6= (I,,  C e,) Tj+ (1,  C) v  (8)
where e  is a Tvector of ones, tl'  =  II  112.....  l.),  and v'  = (vlI,  ... vlr,... vN1,...,vNT).  The C
matrix is given by:
(I-pI),  0  0...  0  0  0
-p  1  0  ...  0  0  0
0  0  0  ...- p  1  0
0  00  ...  0  --p  I
We get an estimate of p using the relationship Pd = I - dpl2 and the fact that:]
E(pd) =  I  (I -p)(T-1)
l+[T  p  - +  2p( 1 -pT)1 (9)
1-P  T(1-P)
which can be solved by standard nonlinear numerical methods.
where z2u  's are the residuals  from a least squares  regression  with individual  dummy  variables of
equation (1). The null of no serial correlation  is rejected in the data if dpis significantly  different from 2.
11 See Baltagi  and Li (1991)  and Wansbeek  and Kapteyn  (1982, 1983)  for further details on this
transformation.
11Having estimated equation (4), we construct a household-specific income uncertainty
term as the variance of the estimated innovation errors in (6):
T
2i,y  =  I  (c  it -6)2IT  (10)
t=1
We also measure household permanent income by
T
InY,P'  InY,,IT  (11)
t=1
where Y, is the predicted income for household i at date t.'2
To test for portfolio effects of income risk we estimate an equation of the form:
sit=Z,'tt+ylnYIP+0[&2  IYP]+ei,  (12)
where Si, is the share of total wealth which is held in unproductive liquid formn  (which we term
the "liquid wealth share"), Zj,  is a vector of exogenous variables. (In terms of the theoretical
model above, S=M/(K+M).) If households hold higher shares of their wealth in liquid form when
they face higher risk then the estimated value of 0 will be positive. Notice that in testing for
precautionary wealth we control for permanent income and other household characteristics which
influence demand for liquid assets, such as for transaction purposes, or via effects on utility or
12  Carroll (1997) and Carroll  and Samwick  (1997) have decomposed  total income risk into
household-specific  permanent  and transient components. We choose not to do this decomposition
because  we have only six observations  per household  to estimate  the two parameters.
12production  functions.  We adopt  the same specification  as (12) for other behavioral  responses  to
risk, as discussed  in the introduction.
One could estimate  equation  (12) using a standard  random  effects  estimator. However,  it
is possible  that several extreme  values are present in wealth  data  making  the error distribution
heavy-tailed. Then there are efficiency  gains in using least absolute  deviation  (LAD)  or median
estimation  procedures  which  are less sensitive  to extreme  values.' 3 Our estimating equation  is:
Su= Quant 8(S.JZ.,, YfP,  i)  +e5i  (13)
where
Quant,(S 1I,Z 1 2,  Y  , 6.)  =  Z;,,s+  Yn5Y,  +0 8 IV  /i']  (14)
which is the &"  conditional  quantile  of Si,  given the explanat:ory  variables.  The LAD estimator  is
asymptotically  normal, facilitating  standard  asymptotic  inference  procedures. The standard
errors of the parameter  estimates  are calculated  using bootstrapping  techniques  and so are robust
to any general  kind of heteroscedasticity  that may be present. We test whether the errors from a
random  effects  estimation  are non-normal.  If the null hypothesis  of the errors being normally
distributed  is rejected,  we estimate  equation  (12) using quanltile  regression  methods. We also test
for heterogeneity  in wealth-holding  behavior  by stratifying  equation  (12) by income group.
3  See, Buchinsky  (1998)  for a survey  on quantile  regression  methods.
133.  Data
I  - -~~~~~~~~~~I
We use panel data formed  from the Rural Household  Surveys  (RHS) of China's  State
Statistical  Bureau. We use a sample  of 6,108 households  over  the six-year  period 1985-90  from
four contiguous  provinces  in southern  China, namely Guangdong,  Guangxi,  Guizhou,  and
Yunnan.  The latter three provinces  make up one of the poorest  regions in China, while
Guangdong  is a relatively  prosperous  coastal province.  Financial  intermediation  in rural areas  is
also better developed  in Guangdong,  as is evident in our data from the fact that the sample  mean
of deposits  per capita in Guangdong  is about four times higher than  in the rest of the sample.1 4
The differences  between Guangdong  and the other  three provinces  in these and other  respects  are
so marked  that our tests will often  separate  out Guangdong.
The RHS is a well-designed  and executed  budget  survey  of a random  sample  of
households  drawn from a sample  frame spanning  rural  China (including  small-medium  towns),
and with unusual  effort made to reduce  non-sampling  errors." 5 Sampled  households  keep  a daily
record of all transactions,  as well as log books on production. Interviewing  assistants  visit each
sampled  household  every two weeks  to check on their progress  and collect  the data. Checks are
made at the county  statistical  office,  with return visits to the households  when necessary.  The
household  data are collated  with geographic  data at the village,  county  and the province  levels.' 6
All nominal  values have been  normalized  by 1985  prices.
14  Mean  deposits  in 1990  prices  are 77.2  Yuan  per  capita  in  Guangdong,  versus  21.0,  8.3,  and
30.3 in Guangxi, Guixhou  and Yunnan  respectively.
'5  Chen and Ravallion  (1996)  describe how  the survey  was done.
16  See Jalan and Ravallion  (1998b)  for details on the geographic  data.
14The computerized  data are annual. So we cannot identify  intra-year  income  risk. In a rural
economy  one naturally  expects  there to be seasonality,  and (less obviously,  but arguably)  the
extent of risk this induces  will vary from place  to place.  With these data, however,  we cannot
assess whether  there is a precautionary  savings  response  to seasonal  income  risk.' 7
The income variable  includes imputed  values for in-kind  income from various  sources
(household  production  which  includes farming,  forestry,  animal  husbandry,  handicrafts,  etc.). It
does not include  borrowings  from (or loans  to) informal  and/or formal  sources.
For the reasons  discussed  in the introduction,  we define  wealth as the sum of cash in
hand, grain stock,  deposits,  value of productive  farm  assets,  housing  materials,  and consumer
durables,  but we exclude  land. "Unproductive  liquid wealth"'  is defined as cash-in-hand  and
grain  holdings of the household. 8
We also consider  two other variables  for which  impacts  of risk are of potential  interest in
this setting. One is schooling.  We use school enrollment  rates as our measure of human  capital  in
the household. That is, we take  the number  of students  between  the ages 6-17 years  as a ratio of
the number  of children  between  the ages 6-17 years  as the school  enrollment  rate of the
household. We are unable  to break this down further  into primary and secondary  school
enrollment  rates at the household  level, because we do not know the level at which  the students
17  It cannot  be presumed  that  there  will  be such  a response.  Using  sub-annual  data  for semi-arid
areas  of India,  Chaudhuri  and  Paxson  (1993)  find  no evidence  that  consumption  is affected  by seasonal
income  changes,  as distinct  from  annual  changes  which  do have  a significant  effect.
18 Some  of the  foodgrain  stock  is productive,  namely  that  Iheld  for  seeds,  but  this is likely  to be a
small  proportion.
15are enirolled. We only have information on their age and whether they are students or not." 9 Since
we do not have data on days of school attendance, we cannot identify any risk effects on the daily
attendance rate conditional on enrollment.
We also test for risk effects on the temporary out migration of family labor. This is a
potentially important route out of poverty in this setting, although historically labor mobility has
been quite restricted in China. Our measure of temporary out-migration is the "labor export
ratio"', defined as the proportion of adult household members (over 18) who are working out of
the township (a local administrative unit comprising many villages) for up to six months of the
last year (in which case they are still counted as part of the household in the RHS.).
In estimating (4), the vector X,, includes age and age 2 of the household head, household
composition, education levels of the household members, occupational dummy variables, both
on their own and interacted with age, land holding and its squared value, geographic variables
including features of the topography of the communities in which the household resides (say,
whether or not the village is in the plains, or hills, or the coastal area, whether it is a minority
area etc.), as well as socio-economic characteristics of the county in which the village of the
household is located in. (For example, proportion of illiterates in the 15+  population in the
county, the infant mortality rate, access to roads, etc.).  A time trend is also included in the
model.  Table 1 gives the income regression.
For identification of equation (12), we follow Kazarosian (1997) in excluding occupation
characteristics, which are assumed to only affect wealth-holding behavior through their effect on
19 Our sample  for the schooling  regressions  is restricted  to households  with children  aged 6-17.
16permanent income and the income risk measure. Thus the vector Z includes all those variables in
X except the occupation dummies and their interactions with age.
Our income risk variable will clearly not capture all the risks that matter to households in
this setting.  Given transaction costs, grain yield uncertainty may well matter independently of its
effect on income risk.  Health risk is also likely to have an independent effect. So we also include
in x two other risk variables which are observed in the data. The first is foodgrain yield risk
measured by the variance of the residuals in a regression of grain yield against the same set of
variables used in the income regression. The second is a measure of medical risk, namely the
variance of the residuals from household expenditure on medicine, medical articles, and medical
treatment regressed on the same set of variables used in explaining incomes. In both cases we
also allow for serial correlation of the errors, similarly to our measure of income risk discussed in
the last section, and in both cases we normalize by the corresponding means.
Table 2 gives descriptive statistics. In addition to the overall sample means we give a
regional breakdown between Guangdong and the other three provinces, and we give a breakdown
by quintiles of households ranked by predicted permanent income per person.
On average, 26.5% of (non-land) wealth is held as cash or grain. 20 The proportion is
slightly lower in Guangdong than in the other three provinces.  Our measure of income risk is
also lower in Guangdong.  It is unclear from this (of course) whether the geographic difference in
the extent of both economic and financial development is reflected in a difference in the extent of
precautionary wealth.  Our estimates of equation (12) may throw further light on this issue.
20  Productive  assets accounted  for 16.5%  of wealth,  housing 44.5%,  consumer  durables 10.3%,
and deposits  2.2%.
17There is only a slight decrease  in the liquid wealth  share as permanent  income  increases.
The income  risk measure,  by contrast  falls steeply  as one moves to higher  quintiles  of permanent
income.
The behavior  of the medical risk  measure  in Table  2 makes  us suspicious  about  how good
a measure  this is. The much higher value in Guangdong  is clearly  not because  Guangdongese
people living there face higher medical  risk. Similarly  the higher values  at higher levels of
permanent  income  are not because the health  of richer people is more  uncertain.  Our measure is
probalbly  picking up an income effect  (even  though we have normalized  the variance  by mean
medical spending).  While we do not think that a better measure is possible  with the data
available,  these results  make us cautious  in interpreting  the results for the effects  of health risk.
4.  Results
We computed  the skewness  and kurtosis  measures  for the liquid wealth  share  and the
school enrollment  rate to check whether  the dependent  variables  that we subsequently  use in our
model]  are normally  distributed. We found strong  evidence  that both variables  are non-normally
distributed. 2'  The case for using the more robust  LAD estimator  (discussed  above)  for these data
is thus compelling. For the labor export  ratio, there is a strong a priori  case for a non-normal
21 For the full sample, the skewness  and kurtosis  measures  for the residuals  from a random
effects regression  of liquid wealth share on Z were 0.878 and 4.244 respectively  and the associated  chi-
square normality  test has a p-value of less  than 0.0001. (Under the null of normality  the skewness
measure  should be zero and the kurtosis  measure  3.) For the regression  of log wealth  per capita on Z they
were -1.244  and 1  1.319,  again strongly  rejecting  normality.  Similarly,  for the school  enrollment  rate, the
skewness  measure is -0.517, the kurtosis  measure  is 6.276, and the p-value  of the chi-square  normality
test is less than 0.0001.  We get very similar patterns  for the other categorizations  analyzed  in the paper.
18error term given the censoring. Out migration  of labor is rare in all but one of the provinces,
namely Guangdong;  excluding  this province,  the average  proportion  of adults out of the village
on work  was only 0.7%. However,  in Guangdong  the sample  mean of the labor export ratio
(proportion  of adults working  outside  the township)  was 5.8%  with a standard  deviation  of 14.6.
So we confined  that part of the analysis  to Guangdong.
4.1  Determinants  of the liquid  wealth  share
Our LAD estimates  of equation  (12) are given in column  1 of Table 3. We find that
higher income  uncertainty  results  in a higher share  of wealth  being held  in unproductive  liquid
forms.  The regression  coefficient  on the income risk measure implies  that eliminating all such
risk would  reduce  the percentage  share  of wealth held as cash or grain  by 0.66%, from 26.5%
(Table  2) to 25.8%. So, while the risk effect is highly significant,  it is quantitatively  small.
Recalling  our concerns  about  the medical risk measure,  and noting  that both this variable
and the farm  yield risk measure  are insignificant  in our estimate  of equation  (12) (column 1,
Table  3), we also re-estimated  the model  dropping  both the medical  risk and farm yield risk. The
results were quite similar to column 1 of Table 3. The coefficient  on income  risk rose slightly, to
0.0320  and was still highly significant  (t-ratio=5.91).  Other coefficients  and their standard errors
were very similar  to Table 3.
Aside from income  risk, we find a number  of other factors  influencing  portfolio  behavior.
There is an inverted  U relationship  between  the liquid wealth  share  and permanent  income,  with
the predicted  liquid wealth  share  peaking  at a log permanent  irncome  of 5.90, which is close to
19the mean (Table 2, last row).  So the fact that the poor tend to hold a higher share of their wealth
in liquid form (Table 2) is due to other factors correlated with income.  Education is clearly one
such factor; it can be seen from Table 3, that there are strong effects of education (the omitted
proportion of household members with post-secondary schooling). Consider two households,
one of which has only illiterate members, while everyone in the other household has secondary
schooling. Otherwise they are identical. Then our model predicts that the share of wealth held in
unproductive liquid forms will be 8.6 percentage points higher for the illiterate household.  This
difference dwarfs the effect of eliminating all income risk. The most likely explanation is that
better educated households obtain a higher rate of return to their investments.
There is also a strong demographic effect on portfolio behavior. The liquid wealth share
falls as household size increases, up to a size of four, and rises after that. There may well be scale
economies in demand for liquid wealth up to some point. Younger households tend to hold more
liquid wealth, possibly because they are more disposed toward engaging in the emerging
oppoirtunities  for money-based market transactions in this setting.
Some of the geographic effects are notable.  The liquid wealth share is significantly lower
in the plains and coastal areas, and higher in the hills and mountains (the latter being the left-out
dummy variable). Farm productivity tends naturally to be lower in the hills and mountains.
Similarly, agricultural development (as measured by irrigation usage) results in significantly
lower share of wealth held in liquid form.  There is a consistency to these effects, and they can be
interpreted as differences arising from external effects of agricultural development in an area on
20the returns to private investment. 22 However, they might also reflect any effects of non-farm rural
development on the transactions demand for money. That is a plausible interpretation of why we
find that higher road density results in a higher share of wealth held in liquid form.  There is a
highly significant positive trend in the liquid wealth ratio. This might also reflect a rising
transactions demand for money balances, as the economy becomes more market oriented.
4.2  Effects of risk on wealth, schooling and out-migration
The second column of Table 3 gives the corresponding regression for total wealth. Here
we also find a significant effect of income risk, which accounts for 3.7% of total wealth. So there
are two effects of risk on total holding of unproductive liquid wvealth,  one through the portfolio
effect (on the liquid wealth share) and one through an effect on total wealth. Combining the two,
it is readily verified from Table 2 and 3 that income risk accounts for about 6.8% of liquid wealth
(more precisely the change in the log of liquid wealth if income risk vanished is
-0.0676).  Roughly half of this (3.1%) is due to the portfolio effect; the rest (3.7%) being due to
the total wealth effect. A 6.8% reduction in liquid wealth holding is equivalent to  13.4% of one
year's  mean permanent income.
It is not clear why we are finding an effect of income risk on total wealth.  The answer
may be that some of the "non-liquid" components of total wealth also have precautionary value.
Within the village or nearby, a household might fairly readily sell (or exchange for foodgrain) a
22  For a deeper  analysis  of such effects see Jalan and Ravallion  (1  998b).
21productive  asset such as a bullock, 23 or even a consumer  durable  such as a bicycle. However,
most of these other wealth  components  are clearly  productive,  so arguably  any precautionary
value they have would  not come at a cost to prospects  of escaping  poverty.
There is also a positive  effect of grain yield risk on total wealth,  though the contribution
of yield risk is small,  accounting  for 0.06%  of wealth. We find no effects of either  the grain
yield risk or medical  risk on either  the composition  of the portfolio  or on total non-land  wealth.
We find no effects  of income  risk on school  enrollments  (column 3, Table 3). Our
dependent  variable  may  however  be too aggregated  to reveal  this effect;  possibly if we had data
on days of attendance  an effect  might be found.
Table 4 gives  our results  for family labor export (recall  that this regression  is only run for
the Gruangdong  sample).  For this regression  we used a censored-conditional  quantile  estimator
(Powell, 1984);  we estimate  this model at the 85% quantile  given  that the dependent  variable  is
so heavily censored  (as discussed  above).  We find a sizable  negative  effect of income  risk on out
migration. Eliminating  all income risk would increase  the mean by 5.5% to 8.8%. Clearly
incorne  risk is an important  impediment  to out-migration  of labor. We find no effect  of farm
yield risk, but a small  positive effect  of the medical  risk.
There are a number  of other factors influencing  out migration.  It is less likely  in younger
fami'lies.  It increases  with average  education  in the family up to secondary,  but then falls.  It is
also higher for households  living in counties with a better  educated  population,  suggesting  a
spillover  effect. It falls as land  holding increases  up to a high level.  (The turning  point is at 2.82
23  On  the role  of livestock  as insurance  in poor  rural  economies  see  Binswanger  and  McIntire
(1987),  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1993),  Dercon  (1998)  and  Fafchamps,  Udry  and  Czukas  (1998).
22mu per person which is almost three standard deviations above the mean of 1.00.) Migration is
more likely from the mountains than the plains, but more likely from the hills than the
mountains. And there is a strong positive trend.
4.3  Stratifications by permanent  income and region
Table 5 gives the stratification of equation (12) by quintiles of permanent income. We do
not reproduce all the regression coefficients (though they are available on request), but only those
related to the three risk measures.
We find a strong indication of an inverted U relationship between income and the size of
the portfolio response to income risk. The significant effect of income risk on the liquidity of
portfolios which is evident in the full sample does not hold amongst either the poorest quintile,
or the richest quintile. But is found amongst the middle three ,quintiles, peaking in the middle
quintile.
Low precautionary demand for liquid wealth by the (relatively) rich suggests that they
either have access to more efficient forms of insurance or to external assistance, or that they have
lower demand for insurance generally. For the poor, low demand for this type of insurance could
reflect how costly it is to current consumption, or it may reflect prospects for external assistance
in bad times.
The effect of income risk on total wealth also has an inverted U relationship with
permanent income (Table 5, lower panel).  There is no significant effect for either the bottom
quintile or the top quintile. So we find no evidence that income risk leads the poorest quintile of
23households  to hold higher levels of wealth;  the effects  we find for the sample  as a whole  are
driven entirely  by the portfolio  behavior  of middle  income groups.
There is also evidence  of an effect  of grain yield risk on total wealth  holding  for the
poorest two quintiles  (as well as the aforementioned  effect on the share  held as cash and grain).
We also find evidence  of an effect of the medical  risk variable  for the poorest  quintile  (Table 5).
Table 5 also gives equation  (12) separately  for Guangdong  versus  the other  three
provirLces.  We see that the income risk effect  on the share  of wealth  held as cash and grain does
not hold in Guangdong,  but does in the other  provinces  as a whole. The risk effect  on total
wealth is found in both regions (lower  two rows of Table 5), and the size of this effect  is
stronger  for Guangdong.  Note, however,  that our measure of income  risk is also lower on
average  in Guangdong  (Table 2), such that the share  of total wealth attributed  to the
precautionary  motive is about the same (4.2%  in Guangdong  and 4.0% in the other  provinces).
So the key regional  difference  is in the extent  to which income  risk is reflected  in portfolio
behavior.  The geographic  difference  in portfolio  behavior  in response  to income  risk is consistent
with ihe difference  in the extend  of financial  market  development  (section  3).
5.  Conclusions
We have studied  portfolio and other  behavioral  responses  to idiosyncratic  risk in rural
areas of southwest  and southern  China  - a setting  in which credit  and insurance  markets  are
poorly developed,  and yet there is pervasive  uncertainty  about future incomes  and  health.
Our results suggest  that only a small share  of wealth is held in unproductive  liquid forms
24to protect  against  income risk. If all income  risk were eliminated,  the mean share of wealth held
in liquid forms would fall from 26.5%  to 25.8%. We find that there is an inverted  U relationship
between  the precautionary  wealth  effect  and permanent  incorne,  such that neither  the poorest
quintile  nor the richest appear  to hold liquid  wealth because  of income  risk; it is the middle
income  groups  that do so. We suspect  that the rich do not need to hold  precautionary  liquid
wealth,  and the poor cannot afford  to do so.
We find some evidence  that liquid  wealth is also held as a precaution  against risk to
foodgrain  yields (independently  of income  risk). We find no clear  signs of a precautionary
response  to medical  risk, though our measure  (based on unexplained  fluctuations  in medical
spending)  may  be contaminated  by income  effects  on medical spending  when sickness occurs.
Schooling  and (hence)  future incomes  appear  to be protected  from both income and
medical  risk. However,  greater uncertainty  about incomes  does appear  to constrain  the temporary
out migration  of family labor, presumably  through  risk of family  labor shortage.  This effect is
sizable;  in the one sample province  in our data set where there is some  out migration,  eliminating
income  risk would  increase  the proportion  of the adults temporarily  working  out of the local area
from 6% to 10%.
Taken  overall,  our results provide  only limited  support for the idea that uninsured risks
promote  unproductive  portfolio  behavior  in this setting. There is such an effect, but it is small in
magnitude,  and cannot  be deemed  an important  cause of poverty.
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30Table  1: Income  regression
Explanatory  variable  Coefficient  t-ratio
Household  size (log)  -0.27303  -7.3600
Household  size 2 (log)  -0.04901  -4.2480
Cultivated  land per capita  0.03134  21.2980
Cultivated  land  per capita 2 -0.00061  -14.0010
Age of household  head  0.29680  80.2400
Age 2 of household  head  -0.00482  -46.9470
Age 3 of household  head  0.00002  28.2790
Whether  farnning  is main occupation  3.35105  39.8220
Whether  industry is main occupation  3.14028  14.7190
Whether  working  in the government  is the main occupation  3.47023  9.6050
Proportion  of preschool  children  in household  -0.39332  -20.4190
Proportion  of kids aged 6-11 years  -0.22498  -11.8300
Proportion  of kids aged 12-14  years  -0.06495  -2.9560
Proportion  of kids aged 15-17  years  0.05507  2.7170
Proportion  of illiterates  in household  0.07191  3.9900
Proportion  of primary  school  educated  in household  0.13976  8.6180
Proportion  of secondary  school  educated  in household  0.27382  14.8210
Plains  (dummy)  0.15825  17.7020
Hills (dummy)  0.07614  10.8100
Coast  (dummy)  0.07333  3.9940
Minority  area (dummy)  -0.03594  -4.7330
Revolutionary  base area (dummy)  -0.03471  -1.6550
Border  area (dummy)  -0.00063  -0.0820
Medical  personnel  per capita  in county  0.01189  12.6010
Cultivated  area which is irrigated  0.29761  11.1320
Cultivated  area on which fertilizer  is used  0.37616  13.8290
Roads  per capita in county  0.00011  8.3760
Infant  mortality  rate in county  -0.00075  -2.5390
Illiterates  in 15+  population  -0.00149  -3.1790
Time trend  -0.01594  -9.9310
Constant  0.46976  22.4610
R'  0.6848
Notes: The model is estimated using random effects panel data techniques, with a serially dependent error
tern.  The modified Durbin-Watson  statistic for the income regression underlying the estimate of the
income risk variable is 1.6487 and the first-order serial correlation coefficient is 0.2686.  The model also
includes interactions between the occupation, age, age 2, age 3. All the variables in the model has been
transformed according to the Prais-Winsten transformation to correct for first-order serial correlation.
31Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable  Full  sample  Stratified  by region  Stratified  by estimated  permanent  income  per person
Guangdong  Guangxi,  Bottom  20h - 40'h  40"'  - 60'h  60t' - 80'h  Top quintile
Guizhou  &  quintile  percentile  percentile  percentile
Yunnan
Liquid wealth  0.2649  0.2304  0.2746  0.2864  0.2776  0.2731  0.2625  0.2246
share (cash and  (0.152)  (0.145)  (0.153)  (0.160)  (0.1512)  (0.1510)  (0.146)  (0.146)
grain)
Log of (non-  6.5322  6.9265  6.4203  5.8954  6.2768  6.4927  6.7462  7.2498
land) wealth  (0.707)  (0.685)  (0.672)  (0.579)  (0.515)  (0.505)  (0.493)  (0.606)
per capita
School  0.5508  0.5613  0.5478  0.5238  0.5654  0.5542  0.5615  0.5491
enrollment  rate  (0.445)  (0.442)  (0.445)  (0.423)  (0.430)  (0.449)  (0.452)  (0.467)
Income  risk  0.2148  0.1369  0.2369  0.3446  0.2428  0.2057  0.1591  0.1217
(X1OOO)  (0.240)  (0.163)  (0.253)  (0.315)  (0.257)  (0.208)  (0.171)  (0.140)
Yield risk  57.1207  44.9769  60.5663  28.6210  108.3974  35.2745  38.5520  74.6603
(919.89)  (355.054)  (1024.94)  (113.169)  (1963.256)  (165.256)  (223.035)  (527.503)
Medical risk  20.4164  42.8038  14.0643  9.2793  11.0484  18.5444  23.2944  39.9149
(97.391)  (178.846)  (54.028)  (30.172)  (37.773)  (73.287)  (95.714)  (173.069)
Log predicted  5.9770  6.3409  5.8737  5.5019  5.7724  5.9539  6.1473  6.5091
permanent  (0.363)  (0.326)  (0.302)  (0.140)  (0.057)  (0.051)  (0.065)  (0.224)
income
Note: Standard  deviations  in parentheses.
32Table 3: Quantile  regressions  for wealth holding  and school enrollment
Liquid  wealth share  Log  of wealth  per capita  School  enrollment  rates
Coefficient  t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient  t-statistic
Risk variables
Income  risk (/1000)  0.0309  5.164  0.1710  10.906  -0.0096  -0.656
Yield  risk (xlOOO)  0.0014  1.055  0.0105  4.733  0.0045  0.924
Medical  risk  (xlO00)  -0.0140  -1.280  0.0210  0.592  -0.0470  -1.399
Other variables
Permanent  income  (log)  0.5099  7.368  0.2441  1.304  1.2964  9.211
Permanent  income 2 (log)  -0.0432  -7.766  0.0888  5.715  -0.0966  -8.608
Household  size (log)  -0.0317  -2.215  -0.1059  -2.321  0.2662  3.211
Household  size (log) 2 0.0124  2.893  0.0189  1.317  -0.1267  -5.358
Age of household  head  -0.0055  -2.032  -0.0049  -0.993  0.0166  1.623
Age 2 of household  head (xlO0)  0.0136  2.299  0.0037  0.355  -0.0240  -1.138
Age 3 of household  head (xlO0)  0.0010  -2.509  0.0003  0.364  0.0009  0.638
Proportion  of pres-school  kids in hh  0.0592  6.151  -0.2470  -8.779  -0.4430  -15.610
Proportion  of kids 6-11 years in hh  0.0538  5.807  -0.1576  -6.713  -0.6335  -28.219
Proportion  of kids 12-14  years in  hh  0.0221  1.975  -0.0893  -3.447  -0.4897  -20.597
Proportion  of kids 15-17  years in hh  -0.0049  -0.453  -0.0477  -1.599  -0.9351  -38.119
Proportion  of illiterates  in hh  0.0626  7.547  -0.1051  -3.878  -0.6905  -22.586
Prop of primary  school educated  0.0385  6.137  -0.0965  -4.109  -0.5329  -25.747
Prop of secondary  school  educated  -0.0233  -3.963  -0.0102  -0.350  -0.3701  -15.244
Cultivated  land per capita  0.0231  7.216  0.0818  11.628  -0.0250  -3.295
Cultivated  land  per capita 2 -0.0012  -2.057  -0.0061  -6.164  0.0006  0.270
Geographic  variables
Plains  (dummy)  -0.0118  -3.986  0.0671  7.383  -0.0118  -1.621
Hills (dummy)  0.0040  1.313  0.0516  7.869  -0.0043  -0.681
Coast  (dummy)  -0.0476  -9.577  -0.0112  -0.659  -0.0049  -0.408
Minority  area (dummy)  -0.0070  -3.089  0.0392  6.758  -0.0009  -0.129
Revolutionary  base area (dummy)  -0.0245  -3.859  -0.0284  -1.543  -0.0234  -2.245
Border  area (dummy)  0.0246  6.762  -0.0014  -0.132  -0.0306  -3.170
Medical  personnel  per capita  0.0007  3.316  -0.0030  -3.901  -0.0008  -1.463
Irrigation  usage on cultivated  area  -0.0426  -6.792  0.1554  8.390  -0.0597  -3.278
Fertilizer  usage on cultivated area  0.0098  1.782  -0.1355  -8.990  -0.0540  -2.645
Roads  per capita (xIOO)  0.0021  6.332  -0.0096  -9.070  -0.0024  -3.047
Infant mortality  rate  0.0003  3.438  0.0024  10.355  0.0007  3.956
Illiterates  in the 15+  population  (xlOO)  0.0097  0.734  -0.2200  -6.213  -0.0720  -2.056
Time trend  0.0223  43.440  0.0105  7.006  -0.0099  -7.760
Constant  -1.3246  -6.006  2.0576  3.494  -3.1338  -6.848
33Table 4: Censored  regression  for out migration  of labor
Coefficient  t-statistic
Risk variables
Income risk (/1000)  -0.1870  -4.295
Yield risk (xO000)  -0.0189  -0.846
Medical risk (xO000)  0.0472  2.249
Other variables
Permanent income (log)  1.8590  2.020
Permanent income 2 -0.1341  -1.895
Household size (log)  0.0786  0.532
Household size 2 0.0124  0.316
Age of household head  0.0062  0.218
Age 2 of household head  0.0001  0.138
Age 3 of household head  0.0000  -0.449
Proportion of preschool kids in household  -0.3124  -3.630
Proportion of kids 6-1 1  years in household  -0.2290  -3.369
Proportion of kids 12-14 years in household  0.0056  0.077
Proportion of kids 15-17  in household  0.0194  0.220
Proportion of illiterate members in household  0.1372  2.613
Proportion of primary school  educated in household  0.1539  2.918
Proportion of secondary school educated in household  0.3576  7.987
Cultivated land per capita  -0.3091  -8.603
Cultivate land per capita 2 0.0549  5.458
Plains (dummy)  -0.0962  -3.277
Hills (dummy)  0.0651  2.645
Coast (dummy)  -0.0482  -1.820
Revolutionary  base area (dummy)  -0.0635  -2.590
Border area (dummy)  -0.0230  -0.711
Medical personnel per capita in the county  -0.0121  -4.026
Cultivated area which is irrigated in the county  0.4019  4.429
Cultivated area on which fertilizers  are used  -0.5136  -8.174
Roads per capita in the county  0.0001  1.707
Infant mortality in the county  0.0031  2.289
Illiterates  in the 15+  population  in the county  -0.0109  -12.588
Time trend  0.0319  7.305
Constant  -6.4215  -2.071
Notes:  The above regressions is for Guangdong province only. Censored  conditional  quantile regression
methods have been used (conditional quantile at 0.85) due to heavy censoring  of the data.
34Table 5: Stratifications  by permanent  ikcome  and region
Income  risk  Yield  risk  Medical  risk
(/1000)  (XlOoo)  (XlOOO)
Dependent variable: ratio of liquid to total wealth
Bottom  quintile  0.0118  0.0329  -0.0419
(1.139)  (2.116)  (-0.439)
20' -40' percentile  0.0282  0.0013  0.0795
(3.050)  (4.622)  (1.775)
40h  - 60t percentile  0.0344  0.0371  -0.0420
(3.287)  (4.640)  (-1.609)
60h  - 80oh  percentile  0.0279  0.0137  -0.0860
(1.647)  (2.069)  (-5.040)
Top quintile  0.0073  0.0116  0.0253
(0.433)  (2.435)  (2.607)
Guangdong  -0.0071  0.0144  0.0067
(-0.462)  (2.458)  (0.403)
Guangxi,  Guizhou,  0.0343  0.0003  -0.0284
Yunnan  (6.754)  (1.948)  (-1.490)
Dependent variable:  Log of wealth per capita
Bottom  quintile  -0.0006  0.1601  0.5786
(-0.029)  (2.183)  (3.266)
20" -40th  percentile  0.1599  0.0100  -0.2708
(4.677)  (2.707)  (-1.898)
40t - 60w  percentile  0.1033  0.0108  -0.1067
(3.047)  (0.160)  (-1.558)
60" -80' percentile  0.2607  0.0796  0.1702
(4.298)  (4.048)  (2.683)
Top  quintile  -0.0625  0.0538  0.0847
(-0.748)  (1.831)  (1.234)
Guangdong  0.3045  0.0001  0.0335
(4.824)  (0.003)  (0.713)
Guangxi,  Guizhou,  0.1704  0.0034  0.0199
Yunnan  (9.569)  (2.407)  (0.266)
Notes:  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics.
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